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According to ideomotor theory, action-effect associations are crucial for voluntary action
control. Recently, a number of studies started to investigate the conditions that mediate
the acquisition and application of action-effect associations by comparing actions carried
out in response to exogenous stimuli (stimulus-based) with actions selected endogenously
(intention-based). There is evidence that the acquisition and/or application of action-effect
associations is boosted when acting in an intention-based action mode. For instance,
bidirectional action-effect associations were diagnosed in a forced choice test phase if
participants previously experienced action-effect couplings in an intention-based but not in
a stimulus-based action mode.The present study aims at investigating effects of the action
mode on action-effect associations in more detail. In a series of experiments, we compared
the strength and durability of short-term action-effect associations (binding) immediately
following intention- as well as stimulus-based actions. Moreover, long-term action-effect
associations (learning) were assessed in a subsequent test phase. Our results show short-
term action-effect associations of equal strength and durability for both action modes.
However, replicating previous results, long-term associations were observed only follow-
ing intention-based actions. These findings indicate that the effect of the action mode
on long-term associations cannot merely be a result of accumulated short-term action-
effect bindings. Instead, only those episodic bindings are selectively perpetuated and
retrieved that integrate action-relevant aspects of the processing event, i.e., in case of
intention-based actions, the link between action and ensuing effect.
Keywords: feature binding, event file, action-effect, sensorimotor integration, ideomotor learning
INTRODUCTION
Humans either carry out actions to achieve desired effects in the
environment or to accommodate to environmental demands. For
instance, pressing the cappuccino button on a coffee dispenser is
primarily based on the agent’s intention to have a hot cup of coffee.
In contrast, flooring the brake pedal at a red traffic light is chiefly
performed in response to a prior stimulus event. These two types
of action have been labeled voluntary, operant, or intention-based,
on the one side, and reaction, response, or stimulus-based, on the
other side.
Neuroscientific evidence suggests that intention- and stimulus-
based actions have distinct neural bases (e.g., Goldberg, 1985;
Passingham, 1993; Praamstra et al., 1995; Deiber et al., 1996;
Waszak et al., 2005, 2012; Mueller et al., 2007; Haggard, 2008). This
distinction is further supported by clinical observations showing
a selective impairment of one type of action and thereby implying
dissociation between intention- and stimulus-based action control
(e.g., Lhermitte, 1983; Shallice et al., 1989).
However, the actual processes that guide these two types of
actions are still not well understood. One obvious functional
difference between intention- and stimulus-based actions is the
role of external stimuli either preceding or following the action.
According to ideomotor reasoning (e.g., Harleß, 1861; James, 1890;
for recent reviews, see Nattkemper et al., 2010; Shin et al., 2010;
Pfister and Janczyk, 2012) intention-based actions are primarily
directed at and selected by the effects following the action whereas
there is a less obvious connection to preceding stimuli. On the
contrary, stimulus-based actions, by definition, crucially depend
on preceding stimuli whereas stimuli following the action are often
less important. Thus, it has been suggested that intention-based
actions rely more strongly on action-effect associations specify-
ing which action produces which effect, whereas stimulus-based
actions rely more strongly on stimulus-response associations spec-
ifying which motor routines action-relevant stimuli habitually
require (Waszak et al., 2005, 2012; Herwig et al., 2007, 2013; Pfister
et al., 2010).
IDEOMOTOR LEARNING
The purported functional difference is supported by a number of
recent studies directly comparing the long-term consequences of
actions carried out in response to exogenous stimuli (stimulus-
based) with actions selected endogenously (intention-based). For
instance, Herwig et al. (2007) investigated ideomotor learning,
that is, the spontaneous acquisition of action-effect associations,
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in intention- and stimulus-based actions. Ideomotor learning
can be assessed in a paradigm conceived by Elsner and Hom-
mel (2001). These authors made participants first undergo an
acquisition phase, in which a self selected key press always pro-
duced a particular tone (e.g., left key press/high-pitch tone; right
key press/low-pitch tone). After having performed about 200 key
presses, the same tones were presented as imperative stimuli for
a speeded choice response in a subsequent test phase. Elsner
and Hommel observed that the speeded choice responses were
faster in response to the tone that the action had previously pro-
duced (e.g., compatible group: low-pitch tone/right key press)
than to a tone that had been produced by the alternative action
(e.g., incompatible group: high-pitch tone/right key press). This
result demonstrates that, during the acquisition phase, partici-
pants acquire long-lasting bidirectional associations between the
motor code of the action and the perceptual code of the audi-
tory effect (i.e., action-effect associations). Presenting the effects
as imperative stimuli in a later test phase leads to the retrieval
of the previously acquired action-effect association which either
speeds up or slows down the speeded choice task depending on
whether the retrieved actions are compatible or incompatible with
the instructed response.
Importantly, the effect of action-effect associations on a sub-
sequent speeded choice task depends on the action mode during
acquisition (Herwig et al., 2007; Herwig and Waszak, 2009; Her-
wig and Horstmann, 2011; but, see Pfister et al., 2011, for different
results with a free choice test). That is, in the studies of Her-
wig and colleagues, a compatibility effect only occurred if, in the
acquisition phase, participants freely selected between left and
right key presses (intention-based acquisition), whereas there was
no compatibility effect if the actions were triggered by external
stimulus events (stimulus-based acquisition). This dependency on
the action mode holds true for such different effect- and action-
modalities like auditory effects and manual actions (Herwig et al.,
2007; Herwig and Waszak, 2009) as well as visual effects and oculo-
motor actions (Herwig and Horstmann, 2011). Moreover, guiding
participants’ attention away or toward the effect did not influ-
ence the pattern of results (Herwig and Waszak, 2009). Thus,
the observed differences between intention- and stimulus-based
actions are not simply due to differences in allocation of attention
to the action-effect event. Instead, the results suggest that one and
the same action-effect event results in different long-term conse-
quences depending on the action mode: if actions are performed
in the intention-based mode, ideomotor learning occurs, that is
new action-effect associations are acquired and later on retrieved
upon effect presentation. In contrast, if actions are selected in
the stimulus-based mode, sensorimotor learning occurs, that is
stimulus-response associations are established while action-effect
associations are much harder to detect subsequently.
It has to be noted that to date it is still under debate why
action-effect associations are much harder to detect following
stimulus-based actions and different hypotheses have been pro-
posed. Herwig et al. (2007) suggested that the action mode affects
the acquisition of action-effect associations. Accordingly, action-
effect associations are weaker following a stimulus-based acqui-
sition compared to an intention-based acquisition which in turn
hampers their later detection. However, the different-acquisition
hypothesis was recently put into question by two studies showing
ideomotor learning also following stimulus-based actions (Pfister
et al., 2011; Wolfensteller and Ruge, 2011). In the study of Pfis-
ter et al. (2011) ideomotor learning was assessed in a free choice
test phase, in which participants were presented with randomly
selected action-effects, which merely served as a trigger to carry out
a self-chosen response. Under these test conditions participants
preferred the selection of the action that was previously produc-
ing the effect regardless of the action mode during acquisition.
To account for the differences between their own results and the
results of Herwig et al. (2007), the authors proposed the different-
application hypothesis (for converging evidence that the action
mode can affect the application of action-effect associations, see
Pfister et al., 2010; Herwig and Horstmann, 2011). According to
this hypothesis, action-effect associations are acquired irrespec-
tive of the action mode, but are applied during the test phase only
if an intention-based mode is adopted. Importantly, adopting an
intention- or a stimulus-based mode depends not only on the cur-
rent task in the test phase (free choice vs. forced choice) but also
on the previous task in the acquisition phase (free choice vs. forced
choice). However, the relationship between these two determin-
ing factors seem to be quite complex. According to Pfister et al.
(2011) the intention-based mode is quickly adopted if partici-
pants carry out self-chosen responses (either during acquisition
or test) and once adopted they will stick to this action mode even
in a forced choice test phase. In contrast, participants slowly adopt
a stimulus-based mode during a forced choice acquisition phase
but remain in this mode only if they continue to perform forced
choice actions in the test phase. Finally, Wolfensteller and Ruge
(2011) suggested a third hypothesis to explain the observed effect
of the action mode on ideomotor learning. In their study partici-
pants had to constantly switch between stimulus-based acquisition
phases of varying lengths and forced choice test phases in which the
effects were presented together with the imperative stimuli1. The
results showed a small but reliable compatibility effect after only 12
action-effect episodes which seems to depend on contextual sta-
bility (i.e., on a consistent stimulus-response mapping). Therefore
Wolfensteller and Ruge proposed the different-context hypothesis
which states that action-effect associations following a stimulus-
based acquisition are contextualized by means of their imperative
stimuli (i.e., stimulus-action-effect episode). Such a contextu-
alization can in principle hamper the retrieval of action-effect
associations if the context (i.e., the imperative stimuli) changes
between acquisition and test (cf., Godden and Baddeley, 1975).
Unfortunately, to date none of the three hypotheses, that is the
different-acquisition, the different-application, and the different-
context hypothesis, can satisfactorily explain all of the divergent
results concerning the effect of the action mode on ideomotor
learning. Thus, one main aim of the present study was to take a
closer look at the emergence of action-effect associations against
1Contrary to previous studies (e.g., Elsner and Hommel, 2001; Herwig et al., 2007;
Pfister et al., 2011), Wolfensteller and Ruge (2011) made their participants switch
repeatedly between acquisition and test phases in one experimental session. It is
possible that this procedure has replaced incidental ideomotor learning by inten-
tional learning since participants might have noticed that the effects will be relevant
in the following test phases.
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the background of the different-acquisition hypothesis proposed
by Herwig et al. (2007).
ACTION-EFFECT BINDING
Up to now, we focused on the influence of the action mode on
the compilation of action-effect associations that may be retrieved
at least a couple of minutes after the acquisition (i.e., long-term
associations or learning, hereafter). However, the build-up of long-
term memory traces is not the only type of perceptuomotor
integration that takes place when humans interact with the envi-
ronment. The other type refers to a much shorter timescale and
is related to one of the main characteristics of the primate brain:
distributed coding (i.e., short-term integration or binding, here-
after)2. Distributed coding refers not only to features in the visual
domain (e.g., shape, color, and location, see Cowey, 1985; Felleman
and van Essen, 1991) and in the auditory domain (e.g., periodic-
ity, location, and spectral shape, Brown and Wang, 2006) but also
as regards the features of to-be-performed actions (e.g., direction,
amplitude, and duration, Wickens et al., 1994).
Importantly, distributed coding creates numerous binding
problems (Treisman, 1996), which call for some kind of integration
mechanism that binds together the distributed codes belonging
to the same object (e.g., color, shape, and motion of an object).
Hommel (1998) argued that the binding problem holds for percep-
tuomotor processing as well. That is, perceptual and motor codes
belonging to the same event need to be integrated, too (Hommel,
2004). Following previous work addressing the creation of “object
files” (Kahneman et al., 1992), the temporarily stored outcome of
this integration process was termed “event file” (Hommel, 1998).
Bindings of stimulus and action features can be assessed in the
prime-probe stimulus-response task of Hommel (1998). In this
paradigm each trial comprises two subtasks. In the first subtask,
participants perform simple, precued left- or right key presses (R1)
to the mere presence of a “Go” signal (S1) that varies randomly in
form, color, and location. The effects of bindings created between
S1- and R1-features on later performance are assessed in a second
subtask, which is a binary-choice reaction (R2) to a pre-instructed
feature (e.g., color) of a second stimulus (S2). The typical result
of this type of paradigm is that performance is impaired in partial
repetition trials, that is, if only the stimulus (or only the response)
is repeated, compared to when both stimulus and response are
repeated or when both change. This pattern of results suggests
that a temporary binding of the respective codes is compiled when
stimuli and actions co-occur. Repeating one feature reactivates
also the associated fellow code, which, in partial repetition tri-
als, creates a mismatch and, therefore, induces a time-consuming
re-binding process (for a review, see Hommel, 2004).
Transient perceptuomotor bindings have been shown to emerge
quickly (after 300 ms or less) and to remain intact for at least 4 s
(Hommel and Colzato, 2004). Moreover, the temporal order of
S1 and R1 does not seem to be important for perceptuomotor
2It should not go unnoticed that the divide between learning and binding is, at
the same time, a divide between short-term and long-term memory. The question
how binding and learning are related is thus also a question about how short-term
memory representations are consolidated and translated into long-term memory.
We will come back to this question in the General Discussion.
binding. Hommel (2005, Experiment 2) showed that stimulus fea-
tures were bound to response features even if S1 follows R1 which
suggests that the temporal time window for feature integration
might be rather broadly defined. Thus, temporary feature binding
across perception and action may take place not only in events,
where the perceptual stimulus triggers the action (stimulus-based
actions), but also in events, where the action triggers the percep-
tual event (intention-based actions). This opens up the possibility
to investigate the immediate binding between actions and their
effects in stimulus- and intention-based actions.
THE PRESENT STUDY
As outlined above, Herwig and colleagues (Herwig et al., 2007;
Herwig and Waszak, 2009; Herwig and Horstmann, 2011) pro-
posed that the acquisition of action-effect associations (i.e., ideo-
motor learning) is affected by the action mode. The present
study investigates whether the action mode also influences tem-
porary feature bindings. Although there is already some evidence
that action-effect bindings can be observed following intention-
based actions (Dutzi and Hommel, 2009) and stimulus-based
actions (see Hommel, 2005; Experiment 2), a direct comparison
of the strength and durability of action-effect bindings following
intention- and stimulus-based actions is lacking. As a consequence,
it is utterly unknown whether temporary action-effect bindings,
too, are affected by the action mode and one main aim of the
present study was to address this gap in the literature.
We ran three experiments that compare strength as well as dura-
bility of action-effect bindings between the two action modes.
Experiments 1 and 2 were designed to test how the two types of
integration, that is, binding and learning, are related. Based on the
different-acquisition hypothesis proposed by Herwig et al. (2007)
we, see three possible relationships (see Colzato et al. (2006), for
similar considerations). First, binding and learning are tightly
linked (strong dependence hypothesis). Binding via synchroniza-
tion may cause long-term modifications of synaptic efficacy as
suggested by Fell et al. (2003). In this scenario, temporary bindings
strengthen the association between two features mediated through
Hebbian learning (i.e., neurons that fire together, wire together;
Hebb, 1949), each time making the memory trace more durable.
The strong dependence hypothesis assumes that the difference
in ideomotor learning between intention- and stimulus-based
actions, as shown by Herwig et al. (2007), is due to a difference in
action-effect binding between the two modes of movement. That
is, if action and effect do not wire together (ideomotor learning)
in stimulus-based actions, then this might be due to the fact that
action and effect features do not always fire together (temporary
bindings) in the first place.
Second, ideomotor learning is completely independent of the
formation of temporary action-effect bindings. Although such a
non-dependence hypothesis is rather radical, it is not so unlikely,
since binding and learning act on different time-scales and are
thought to solve different problems, with bindings being involved
in the problem of distributed coding and ideomotor learning being
involved in the control of voluntary actions. Under this view tem-
porary feature binding represents a representational level which is
mainly used for the perception of the current event. Action-effect
associations underlying ideomotor learning, however, represent a
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different representational level at which integrated feature assem-
blies are stored for the purpose of future guidance of behavior.
Accordingly, there might be two crucial distinctions between both
levels of representation. First, bindings as part of short-term mem-
ory depend on the actual presentation of an external effect,whereas
action-effect associations as part of long-term memory depend
on the internal generation of the effect. As a consequence, both
representational levels might fundamentally differ in the level of
detail and concreteness they are able to provide. Second, while
action-effect associations underlying ideomotor learning presup-
pose contingent action-effect relationships (Elsner and Hommel,
2004), short-term bindings are also engaged in the perception of
ever-changing action-effect relationships – just think of the dif-
ferent sounds one produces while talking with the mouth empty
vs. full or the different ball trajectories one produces while playing
pinball. Accordingly, both levels might fundamentally differ in the
range of events they are able to incorporate. The non-dependence
hypothesis thus assumes that the difference in ideomotor learn-
ing between intention- and stimulus-based actions (Herwig et al.,
2007) do not have to be reflected in short-term bindings.
Third, binding and learning may not be as rigidly connected as
assumed under the strong dependence hypothesis and not as inde-
pendent as under the non-dependence hypothesis. In daily life, the
particular effect that an action achieves depends tremendously on
the current context. It would appear inefficient to perpetuate all
episodes, that is, even those which are not needed anymore once
the particular event is finished. This should especially hold true
for non-contingent action-effects which cannot be reliable used for
action planning. On the weak dependence view, binding and learn-
ing do not take place on fundamentally different levels. Instead,
bindings are the building blocks for long-term associations, but
only those bindings which are reliable and thus worthwhile to be
preserved are further processed to form a more durable memory
trace (see Colzato et al., 2006). The weak dependence hypoth-
esis thus assumes that binding and learning are related only in
case of contingency. Therefore, the difference in ideomotor learn-
ing between intention- and stimulus-based actions (Herwig et al.,
2007), should only be reflected in short-term bindings of contin-
gent action-effects, whereas it should not be reflected in short-term
bindings of non-contingent action-effects.
Experiments 1 and 2 are designed to pit these three accounts
against each other. The crucial difference between the experiments
is that in Experiment 1 the features of the action-effect were not
contingent on the action (as it is usually the case in this type of
experiment), whereas in Experiments 2 they were contingent. The
strong dependence hypothesis assumes that a difference in action-
effect binding is the reason for the difference in ideomotor learning
between intention- and stimulus-based actions. Consequently,
this hypothesis predicts that intention-based actions result in
both experiments in stronger binding effects than stimulus-based
actions. The non-dependence hypothesis predicts that intention-
based actions result neither in Experiment 1 nor in Experiment
2 in stronger binding than stimulus-based actions, since under
this view learning and binding represent two different representa-
tional levels. Finally, the weak dependence hypothesis predicts that
intention-based actions result only in Experiment 2 in stronger
binding than stimulus-based actions, but not in Experiment 1.
This is because contingent action-effects can be used only in Exper-
iment 2 but not in Experiment 1 as building blocks for long-term
associations. Experiment 3 complements Experiments 1 and 2 by
directly comparing binding and ideomotor learning within one
experiment.
To sum up, the present study addresses two research questions.
First, are temporary bindings between action and effect features
modulated by the action mode? Second, how are short-term
bindings and long-term ideomotor learning related?
EXPERIMENT 1
To investigate the influence of the action mode on temporary
action-effect bindings, we slightly modified the original prime-
probe stimulus-response task comprising of two subtasks (see
above; Hommel, 1998). In the first subtask, the first response (R1)
to a neutral go signal was either freely selected (intention-based
trials) or precued (stimulus-based trials). In both cases it triggered
one out of four auditory effect stimuli (S1; see Figure 1). The sec-
ond subtask was a speeded forced choice response (R2) to a second
stimulus (S2). Moreover, we manipulated the stimulus-onset asyn-
chrony (SOA) between S1 and S2 (1000 vs. 2000 vs. 6000 ms) to
assess binding durability.
To assess the binding between features of R1 and S1, our focus
was on interactions between stimulus and response repetition
effects. On the basis of earlier findings regarding perceptuomotor
binding (Hommel, 2005, Experiment 2), we expected that per-
formance is impaired on partial repetition trials, in which either
the response feature is repeated while the stimulus feature is alter-
nated, or the stimulus feature is repeated while the response feature
is alternated (partial repetition costs). By contrast, alternating both
stimulus and response between the two subtasks of one trial should
yield a performance level in the second subtask that is as good as
when both are repeated. Such a pattern of results points to action-
effect binding, since it implies that reactivating one feature tends
to also activate the fellow feature. This, in turn, causes conflict in
case of partial repetitions.
The crucial question was whether this interaction would be
modulated by the action mode (intention- vs. stimulus-based).
Under the strong dependence hypothesis of the relation between
learning and binding, one would expect action-effect bindings to
be weaker or less durable for stimulus-based than for intention-
based actions. In this case the fragility of action-effect bindings
in stimulus-based actions could be considered to be responsi-
ble for the effect of the action mode on ideomotor learning (see
Herwig et al., 2007; Herwig and Waszak, 2009). Under the weak
dependence hypothesis as well as the non-dependence hypothesis,
binding should not be influenced by the action mode.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Sixteen adults (mean age: 24.9 years) participated. They reported
having normal or corrected-to-normal vision and audition and
were not familiar with the purpose of the experiment. Informed
consent was obtained from all subjects.
Apparatus and stimuli
The experiment was controlled by a standard PC, interfaced to
a 17′′ monitor. The viewing distance was about 70 cm. Visual
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FIGURE 1 | Basic experimental setup to assess action-effect
bindings. The first subtask consists of a simple go response (R1) either
in a stimulus-based (A) or intention-based (B) action mode which
triggered the auditory presentation of stimulus 1 (S1). The second
subtask is a binary-choice response to the number feature of stimulus 2
(S2). Note that the stimulus-onset asynchrony (SOA) was varied in
Experiments 1 and 2 (1000, 2000, 6000 ms) and was constant in
Experiments 3 (1000 ms).
stimuli were displayed on a black background. In stimulus-based
trials, two white left- or right-pointing arrows (mean extension:
0.4˚× 0.7˚) served as response cues and were presented in the cen-
ter of the screen. In intention-based trials, the response cue was
replaced by the free choice cue, i.e., two arrows pointing in different
directions (<>) requesting participants to prepare a left or right
key press depending on their own choice. A white rectangle (mean
extension: 0.7˚× 1.0˚) served as a go signal for the execution of
the precued/prepared response. Auditory stimuli were the English
numbers“2”and“10”vocalized by a male or female voice (duration
200–300 ms). The words were presented simultaneously through
the left and right speaker of a headphone. Responses were made
by pressing the left or right of two keys mounted in a horizontal
distance of 13.5 cm on a board with the left or right index finger.
Procedure and design
Each trial comprised two speeded responses. The first response
(R1) was always a simple reaction to the go signal. The type of
response (i.e., left or right key press) was either indicated by the
response cue (stimulus-based trials) or depended on participants’
own choice (intention-based trials). R1 triggered the presentation
of the first auditory effect stimulus (S1). Whether the stimulus
was the number 2 or 10 vocalized by a male or a female voice
was determined randomly. The second response (R2) was always a
binary-choice reaction to the number feature of the second stim-
ulus (S2). S2 was again either the number 2 or 10 vocalized by
either a male or a female voice, randomly determined. Half of the
participants responded to the number 2 and 10 by pressing the
left and right key, respectively, whereas the other half responded
according to the opposite mapping.
The sequence of events in each trial is shown in Figure 1. Fol-
lowing an intertrial interval of 2000 ms, a response cue or a free
choice cue was presented for 1500 ms, followed by the go signal
that was presented until the first response was executed. R1 trig-
gered the presentation of S1 (50-ms onset asynchrony between R1
and S1). If R1 was not executed within 1000 ms (counted as omis-
sion) a visual warning message (too slow) was presented for 800 ms
and the trial started from the beginning. If R1 was incorrect (only
possible in stimulus-based trials) or anticipatory (RT< 80 ms) a
visual warning message (wrong key, too fast, respectively) was pre-
sented for 800 ms and the trial continued. S2 appeared 1000, 2000,
or 6000 ms after the onset of S1. Responses to S2 that were incor-
rect,premature (RT< 80 ms) or omitted (RT> 2000 ms) triggered
presentation of the corresponding visual warning message.
The experiment was divided into four parts which were done in
1 day. Two of the four parts consisted of 3 blocks of 96 randomly
ordered intention-based trials each and the remaining two parts
of 3 blocks of 96 randomly ordered stimulus-based trials each.
The order of the four parts was counterbalanced across partici-
pants. Participants performed 24 randomly selected practice trials
at the beginning of the experiment and prior to the first switch of
the action mode. That is, all in all the experiment comprised 48
practice trials and 1152 experimental trials which took approxi-
mately 4 h. Each block was composed of a factorial combination
of S2 number (2 vs. 10, corresponding to left vs. right R2) and
S2 gender (male vs. female), the possible relationships between S1
and S2 (repetition vs. alternation) regarding number and gender,
the SOA between S1 and S2 (1000 vs. 2000 vs. 6000 ms), and the
two possible relationships between R1 and R2 (repetition vs. alter-
nation). In intention-based blocks, in contrast, the relationship
between R1 and R2 could not be determined a priori because R1
depends on participants’ free choice. In these blocks participants
were instructed to use the left and right key for the first response
about equally often and in a random order. Participants could take
a break after each block.
RESULTS
For the sake of clarity and according to our main question (i.e.,
action-effect bindings for intention- and stimulus-based actions),
we present only the results of subtask 2 and, specifically only the
reliable effects in the main text. The Appendix presents the results
of subtask 1 as well as two tables which provide a detailed overview
of the means (see Table A1 in Appendix) and ANOVA outcomes
(see Table A2 in Appendix) for RTs and error rates obtained for
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subtask 2. After excluding trials in which R2 was anticipated or
omitted (0.2%), R2 data were analyzed as a function of the action
mode (intention- vs. stimulus-based), SOA (1000 vs. 2000 vs.
6000 ms), and repetition vs. alternation of stimulus number, gen-
der, and response. Analyses of variance (ANOVA) with the factors
Action mode (intention- vs. stimulus-based), Response (repeti-
tion vs. alternation), Number (repetition vs. alternation), Gender
(repetition vs. alternation), and SOA (1000 vs. 2000 vs. 6000 ms)
were performed on error rates and error-free RTs by using a five-
way design for repeated measures. Violations of sphericity were
corrected using the Huynh–Feldt ε. The significance criterion was
set to p< 0.05 for all analyses.
Reaction times
The RT analysis yielded five reliable effects and importantly, none
of these effects interacted with the action mode (ps> 0.24). There
were main effects of SOA, response, and gender. These main effects
indicated faster responses with increasing SOA (661, 637, and
603 ms for SOA of 1000, 2000, and 6000 ms, respectively), for
response alternations (643 and 624 ms for response repetitions
and alternations, respectively), and for gender repetitions (623
and 644 ms for gender repetitions and alternations, respectively).
The main effect of gender was further modified by an interaction
with number, indicating an integration of the auditory stimulus
features number and gender.
More importantly, the main effect of response was modified
by an interaction with number, indicating action-effect binding.
Figure 2 shows the relative repetition benefit for each stimulus
dimension (i.e., the mean RT difference between number/gender
alternation and number/gender repetition; note that the values
depicted in Figure 2 are differences of averaged values given in
Table A1 in Appendix) as a function of the relationship between
R1 and R2 separated for intention- and stimulus-based trials
and the three SOAs. A positive difference indicates that partici-
pants responded faster for stimulus repetitions than alternations,
whereas a negative difference indicates faster reactions for stimulus
alternations than repetitions. As Figure 2 clearly shows, repeating
stimulus number produces a benefit if, and only if, the response is
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FIGURE 2 | Stimulus (S1–S2) repetition benefits (RTalternation-RTrepetition) in
Experiment 1 for stimulus features number and gender for
intention-based (left panels) and stimulus-based trials (right panels) as a
function of response relation (R1–R2 repetition or alternation) and
stimulus-onset asynchrony (SOA 1000, 2000, and 6000 ms, from top to
bottom). Error bars represent the 95% confidence interval of individual
means. If error bars do not cross the midline, the repetition benefit (or cost) is
significantly different from zero (p<0.05).
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also repeated. If the response is alternated, the repetition benefit
turns into an alternation benefit. This was true for all three SOAs.
Error rates
The error rates overall mirrored the RTs but produced some addi-
tional effects. Importantly, once again none of the reported effects
was modified by the action mode (ps> 0.27). As concerns the main
effects, participants committed fewer errors with increasing SOA
and response alternations. However, in contrast to the RT data,
participants committed fewer errors with gender alternations (3.0
and 2.5% for gender repetitions and alternations, respectively).
Thus a speed-accuracy trade-off can be excluded for the factors
SOA and response, but not for gender. The main effect of response
was modified by an interaction with SOA, indicating an increased
alternation benefit with the medium SOA of 2000 ms.
Of importance, response interacted with number as well as
with gender, indicating that each stimulus dimension was sepa-
rately integrated with the response. Repeating both the number
and the response or alternating both (1.8 and 0.9%, respec-
tively) decreased the error rate, whereas the error rate increased
if only one, but not the other, was repeated (number repeated:
3.5%; response repeated: 4.9%). Likewise, a response repeti-
tion was easier if gender was also repeated than alternated (3.2
and 3.4%, respectively), whereas a response alternation was eas-
ier if gender was also alternated than repeated (1.7 and 2.8%,
respectively). Moreover, action-effect bindings for both effect
features interacted with SOA. Separate ANOVAs for each SOA
showed both interactions to be significant only for the SOAs of
1000 [response× number: F(1,15)= 36,80, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.71,
response× gender: F(1,15)= 12.06, p= 0.003, η2p = 0.45] and
2000 ms [response× number: F(1,15)= 24.30, p< 0.001, η2p =
0.62; response× gender: F(1,15)= 4.83, p= 0.044, η2p = 0.24]
but not for the SOA of 6000 ms (ps> 0.143).
DISCUSSION
As shown in Figure 2, the effect of stimulus repetition was clearly
dependent on whether or not the response was also repeated. Thus,
Experiment 1 suggests that the co-occurrence of action and audi-
tory codes triggered by the action results in the temporary binding
between the involved perceptual and motor features. Comparable
to studies investigating perceptuomotor binding (e.g., Hommel,
1998), action-effect bindings were pronounced for the task rele-
vant stimulus feature (i.e., number). Moreover, the analysis of RTs
of Experiment 1 showed action-effect bindings to remain intact
for at least six seconds – a finding that extends the results regard-
ing the durability of perceptuomotor bindings by 2 s (Hommel
and Colzato, 2004).
More importantly, Experiment 1 did not show any influence of
the action mode on the strengths or durability of the action-effect
bindings. That is, short-term action-effect bindings were compa-
rably strong and durable following intention- and stimulus-based
actions. This observation is in contrast to the predictions derived
from the strong dependence hypothesis of binding and learn-
ing. Thus, the finding of Herwig et al., 2007; see also Herwig
and Waszak, 2009; Herwig and Horstmann, 2011) that ideomo-
tor learning is affected by the action mode does not seem to be
due to an elementary difference in action-effect binding.
However, the dissociation of the effect of the action mode on
binding and learning is in accord with the non-dependence as
well as the weak dependence hypothesis. If binding and learn-
ing actually represent two independent representational levels (as
suggested by the non-dependence hypothesis), one would not
expect binding and learning to be influenced by the same fac-
tors. According to the weak dependence hypothesis action-effect
binding is a necessary, but not a sufficient precursor for long-
term ideomotor learning. In this scenario, the action mode might
determine whether or not the repeated formation of identical tran-
sient bindings forms a memory trace. Metaphorically speaking,
bindings may be regarded as building blocks that are constructed
whenever an effect is produced in close temporal contiguity by an
action regardless of whether the action was externally or internally
selected. However, only intention-based actions, but not stimulus-
based actions, may provide the glue necessary to agglutinate these
building blocks to form a durable memory trace.
This notion can only be tested if one effect feature is pro-
duced contingently by one and not the other action. In Exper-
iments 1 each effect feature was produced by each action with
the same probability. Consequently, distinct action-effect relations
could not be established. Therefore, we implemented contingent
action-effect mappings in Experiments 2 and 3.
EXPERIMENT 2
As pointed out above, one reason for the missing influence of
the action mode on the formation and durability of action-effect
bindings might be related to the fact that each effect feature was
produced by each action with the same probability. It is possible
that due to this missing contingency between action and effect
features binding and learning are unrelated as suggested by the
weak dependence hypothesis. To address this issue, Experiment 2
was conducted, in which each action (R1) contingently produced
one specification of the irrelevant effect feature of S1 (i.e., gender).
For example, pressing the left key led to the auditory presentation
of the number “2” or “10” spoken by a female voice, whereas press-
ing the right key resulted in the presentation of the number “2” or
“10” spoken by a male voice.
Such a contingency manipulation should in principle enhance
ideomotor learning (Elsner and Hommel, 2004). Importantly, if
the weak dependence hypothesis holds (i.e., if binding and learning
are only related in case of a contingent action-effect relationships),
this enhancement should be reflected in partial repetition costs as
well. This is because in Experiment 2 R2 may be affected by two
factors: the event file compiled during the fist subtask of each trial
and the memory trace emerging through the repeated experience
of the contingent action-effect mapping. Both factors should entail
RT costs if only the gender or the response is repeated while the
other feature is alternated (i.e., partial repetition costs). Consider,
for instance, an action-effect mapping for R1–S1 that links a left
key press with a female voice (F) and a right key press with a male
voice (M ). Moreover, the stimulus-response mapping rule for S2–
R2 be to respond to the number two (2) and ten (10) by pressing
the right and left key, respectively. If S2 is the number two spoken
by a female voice (2F), this might lead to a conflict in initiating R2
because female may automatically activate the left response due to
the compiled memory trace, whereas 2 calls for a right response
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due to the instructed mapping. Likewise, if S2 is 10M, 10 calls
for a left whereas male calls for a right response. In contrast, no
conflict arises if S2 is 2M or 10F, because the number as well as
the gender feature call for the same response. Importantly, in the
given example, 2F and 10M would also be the partial repetitions
with respect to R1–S1, because a left R1 always triggers S1 spo-
ken with a female voice and a right R1 always triggers S1 spoken
with a male voice (leaving 2M and 10F as complete repetitions
or complete alternations). Accordingly, if contingency determines
whether binding and learning are related or not, one would expect
R2 to be influenced by the previously compiled event file and the
accumulating memory trace only for intention-based actions. In
contrast, for stimulus-based actions R2 should be affected solely
by the event file, resulting in a three-way interaction of response,
gender, and action mode.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants were 32 adults (mean age 24.2 years) who fulfilled the
same criteria as those in Experiments 1. The method was the same
as in Experiment 1, with the following exceptions. The gender fea-
ture of S1 depended on R1 (e.g., left key press/female voice, right
key press/male voice), whereas there was, as in Experiment 1, no
contingency regarding the number feature of S1. The action-effect
mapping was counterbalanced across participants. Participants
were not informed about the contingency manipulation3. More-
over, in contrast to Experiment 1, the action mode (intention-
vs. stimulus-based) was manipulated between subjects to avoid
transfer effects (i.e., to be sure that R2 following stimulus-based
actions was not influenced by accumulated memory traces that
were established following intention-based actions). The exper-
iment consisted of 6 blocks of 96 randomly ordered trials and
took approximately 2 h. Each block was composed of the possible
combinations of two R1 alternatives (left vs. right), two S1 alter-
natives (2 vs. 10, either male or female voice depending on R1),
four S2 alternatives (2-male, 2-female, 10-male, 10-female), three
SOAs (1000, 2000, 6000 ms), and two repetitions of each combina-
tion. Importantly, the independence of repetition vs. alternation
regarding number, gender, and response remained unchanged by
the contingency manipulation, since R2 was always a reaction to
the number feature (and not to the gender feature) of S2.
RESULTS
As for Experiment 1, we present only the reliable effects of subtask
2 in the main text. The Appendix presents the results of subtask 1
as well as the means (see Table A3 in Appendix) and ANOVA out-
comes (see Table A4 in Appendix) for RTs and error rates obtained
for subtask 2. After excluding trials in which R2 was anticipated
or omitted (0.3%), R2 data were analyzed as in Experiment 1.
ANOVA with the between subjects factor Action mode (intention-
vs. stimulus-based) and the within subjects factors Response (repe-
tition vs. alternation), Number (repetition vs. alternation), Gender
3A post-test survey revealed that only 5 (all in the intention-based group) of the
32 participants recognized the correct action-effect mapping among four alterna-
tives. The four alternatives they had to choose from were (1) left keypress=male
voice; (2) left keypress= female voice; 3= right keypress=male voice; 4= right
keypress= female voice.
(repetition vs. alternation), and SOA (1000 vs. 2000 vs. 6000 ms)
were performed on error rates and error-free RTs.
Reaction times
The RT analysis produced various reliable effects. Importantly,
action-effect bindings were not modulated by the action mode
(ps> 0.24). Beside the main effects of SOA, response, number, and
gender, indicating faster responses with increasing SOA (586, 566,
and 544 ms), faster responses for response alternations (575 and
556 ms), number repetitions (560 and 571 ms), and gender repeti-
tions (560 and 571 ms), all three two-way interactions between
response, number, and gender reached significance, indicating
stimulus feature as well as action-effect bindings.
As shown in Figure 3, repeating stimulus number or gender
produce a benefit if, and only if, the response is also repeated,
whereas the repetition benefit turns into an alternation benefit if
the response is alternated. Although the response× number inter-
action was further modified by SOA, separate ANOVAs showed the
interaction to be significant for all three SOAs. Noteworthy, there
was a three-way interaction of response× number× gender that
was due to a decrease of the response-by-gender interaction-effect
if the number was alternated. However, separate ANOVAs showed
the response-by-gender interaction to be significant for number
repetitions [(F(1,30)= 40.91, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.58] as well as
number alternations [F(1,30)= 4.63, p= 0.040, η2p = 0.13].
Error rates
The error rates overall mirrored the RTs. Importantly, once again
none of the reported effects was modified by the action mode.
Beside the main effects of SOA and response, the two binary inter-
actions between response and number and response and gender
followed the same pattern as the RTs and indicated action-effect
binding. That is, repeating both the number and the response or
alternating both (2.2 and 0.7%, respectively) decreased the error
rate, whereas the error rate increased if only one, but not the other,
was repeated (number repeated: 4.4%; response repeated: 4.8%).
In the same way, repeating both the gender and the response or
alternating both (3.1 and 1.7%, respectively) decreased the error
rate, whereas the error rate increased if only one, but not the other,
was repeated (gender repeated: 3.4%; response repeated: 4.0%).
Both action-effect bindings were further modified by SOA. Sepa-
rate ANOVAs showed the response-by-number interaction to be
significant for all SOAs, whereas the response-by-gender interac-
tion was only significant for the SOAs of 1000 and 2000 ms but
not for the SOA of 6000 ms (p> 0.37). The three-way interac-
tion of response× number× gender followed the same pattern
as the RTs and was due to a decrease of the response-by-gender
interaction-effect if the number was alternated.
DISCUSSION
First of all, Experiment 2 yielded a reliable response-by-gender
interaction, i.e., an interaction between the response and the con-
tingent (first subtask), but task irrelevant (second subtask) effect
feature. Although pronounced for repetitions of the task relevant
feature this action-effect binding occurred also for alternations of
the task relevant feature. This pattern of results suggests two things.
First, each effect feature (i.e., the relevant but non-contingent
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FIGURE 3 | Stimulus (S1–S2) repetition benefits (RTalternation-RTrepetition) in
Experiment 2 for stimulus features number and gender for
intention-based (left panels) and stimulus-based group (right panels) as
a function of response relation (R1–R2 repetition or alternation) and
stimulus-onset asynchrony (SOA 1000, 2000, and 6000 ms, from top to
bottom). Error bars represent the 95% confidence interval of individual
means. If error bars do not cross the midline, the repetition benefit (or cost) is
significantly different from zero (p<0.05).
number feature as well as the irrelevant but contingent gender
feature) is separately bound to the action. Second, in addition to
these single feature bindings, there is also a binding between the
action and a compound of both effect features.
More importantly, the action mode did not modify the bind-
ings’ strength or durability even under action-effect contingency.
We also reran the ANOVA on RTs with the additional factor half of
the experiment (first half vs. second half) to test whether the action
mode modifies bindings only after some experience with the con-
tingent action-effect mapping. This ANOVA also did not provide
any evidence for an effect of the action mode (four-way inter-
action of Experiment half, Response, Gender, and Action mode,
p> 0.78).
To sum up, the outcome of Experiment 2 failed to find an
influence of the action mode on bindings between actions and
their ensuing effect features, even though action and effect (gen-
der) were contingent across the experiment. In light of previous
studies showing that ideomotor learning can be affected by the
action mode (Herwig et al., 2007), this finding is more in line
with the non-dependence hypothesis than with the predictions
derived from the weak dependence hypothesis of binding and
learning. This is because the latter hypothesis assumes that bind-
ing and learning are related under action-effect contingency and
thus should be influenced by the same factors.
However, two caveats impinging on the present data has to be
taken into account before these results can be taken as evidence
that ideomotor learning is more ore less independent of short-
term action-effect bindings. First, intermingling effect-producing
actions (subtask one) with choice responses to stimuli (subtask
two) in Experiment 2 might have interfered with ideomotor
learning. Second, up to now, we investigated binding (current
study) and learning (Herwig et al., 2007; Herwig and Waszak,
2009; Herwig and Horstmann, 2011) in different experiments
using different experimental designs.
EXPERIMENT 3
Experiment 3 was conducted to deal with these two caveats. To
this end, we assessed both, bindings during an acquisition phase
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and ideomotor learning in a subsequent test phase. The acquisi-
tion phase was modeled after Experiment 2 so that once again the
gender feature of S1 depended on R1. (We call the first part of
the experiment acquisition phase, because in participants should
acquire long-term memory traces. However, at the same time the
acquisition phase served to test for temporary bindings, just as
in Experiments 1 and 2.) In the additional test phase, partici-
pants were instructed to respond to the number feature of new
stimuli (the English numbers “four” or “five”) either with a left or
a right key press. Importantly, the new stimuli were spoken either
with a male or a female voice. If ideomotor learning occurs, than
one would expect to find facilitation if the instructed stimulus
feature number calls for the same response to which the task irrel-
evant feature gender is associated (compatible trials). In contrast,
interference should occur if number and gender call for different
responses (incompatible trials).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Thirty-two adults (mean age 25.1 years) who fulfilled the same cri-
teria as those in the previous experiments participated in this single
session experiment of about 1 h. The experiment was divided in
an acquisition and a test phase. The method used during acquisi-
tion was the same as in Experiment 2, with the only exception
that there was no SOA manipulation and S2 always appeared
1000 ms after the onset of S1. The acquisition phase consisted
of 2 blocks of 96 randomly ordered trials. Half of the partici-
pants executed R1 in an intention-based way, whereas the other
half executed R1 in a stimulus-based way. After completing the
acquisition phase, participants received an on-screen instruction
of the required stimulus-response mapping for the test phase. In
each test trial one out of four possible new stimuli (“four” or “five”
vocalized by a male or a female voice) was presented. Half of the
participants were instructed to respond to the number “four” with
a left key press and to the number “five” with a right key press,
whereas this mapping was reversed for the other half of partici-
pants. The next trial started 2000 ms after the response. The test
phase comprised 200 randomly ordered trials (100 compatible and
100 incompatible trials).
RESULTS
Acquisition phase
The Appendix presents the results of subtask 1 as well as the means
(see Table A5 in Appendix) obtained for subtask 2. After excluding
trials in which R2 was anticipated or omitted (0.1%), an ANOVA
on R2 data was performed on error rates and error-free RTs
with the between subjects factor Action mode (intention-based
vs. stimulus-based) and the within subjects factors Response (rep-
etition vs. alternation), Number (repetition vs. alternation), and
Gender (repetition vs. alternation).
The RTs produced six reliable effects. Once again, action-
effect bindings were not modified by the action mode (Fs< 1,
ps> 0.441). Beside the main effect of gender [F(1,30)= 7.80,
p= 0.009, η2p = 0.21], indicating faster response if gender was
repeated than alternated (496 and 511 ms, respectively), there
was an interaction of number with action mode [F(1,30)= 5.67,
p= 0.024, η2p = 0.16]. This interaction was due to faster
responses if number was repeated in the stimulus-based group
(477 and 491 ms), whereas responses were slower if number
was repeated in the intention-based group (530 and 516 ms).
Of importance, all three binary interactions between response,
number, and gender reached statistically significance. That is the
interaction of number and gender [F(1,30)= 41.32, p< 0.001
η2p = 0.58] indicated stimulus feature binding, whereas the inter-
actions of response and number [F(1,30)= 104.67, p< 0.001,
η2p = 0.78] and response and gender [F(1,30)= 5.68, p= 0.024,
η2p = 0.16] indicated action-effect bindings. As depicted in
Figure 4, repeating stimulus number or gender produce a ben-
efit only if the response is repeated, whereas this benefit turns
into in alternation benefit (as concerns the number feature)
or vanishes (as concerns the gender feature) if the response
is alternated. The sixth reliable effect was a three-way interac-
tion of response× number× gender [F(1,30)= 4.47, p= 0.043,
η2p = 0.13]. Separate ANOVAs revealed that the response-by-
gender interaction was pronounced for complete repetitions and
alternations of response and number (p< 0.001), whereas it was
absent for partial repetitions (p= 0.462).
The error rates mirrored both action-effect bindings observed
in the RTs. Importantly, action-effect bindings were not mod-
ified by the action mode. The response-by-number interaction
[F(1,30)= 17.42, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.37] as well as the response-
by-gender interaction [F(1,30)= 7.66, p= 0.010, η2p = 0.20]
reached statistical significance. Repeating both the number and the
response or alternating both (2.5 and 1.1%, respectively) decreased
the error rate, whereas the error rate increased if only one, but
not the other, was repeated (number repeated: 5.4%; response
repeated: 6.1%). Likewise, complete repetitions or alternations of
response and gender decreased the error rate (3.1 and 2.4%,respec-
tively), whereas the error rate increased with partial repetitions
(gender repeated: 4.0%; response repeated: 5.5%). The ANOVA of
error rates yielded no further reliable effects.
Test phase
Error rates and error-free mean RTs of the test phase were ana-
lyzed by mixed ANOVAs as a function of the action mode during
the acquisition phase (between subjects factor) and compatibility
(within-subject factor). The analysis of RTs yielded a significant
interaction of the action mode and compatibility [F(1,30)= 5.41,
p= 0.027, η2p = 0.15]. None of the main effects reached sta-
tistical significance (Fs< 1, p< 0.430). As shown in Figure 5
and as revealed by separate t -test, participants responded sig-
nificantly faster on compatible (482 ms) than incompatible trials
(495 ms) in the intention-based group [t (15)=−2.16, p= 0.047,
d = 0.54, two-tailed], whereas there was no compatibility effect
for the stimulus-based group [t (15)= 1.10, p= 0.287, d= 0.28,
two-tailed]. The ANOVA on error rates did not yield any reliable
effect. Suffice it to say that errors did not counteract the RT data,
and thus, a speed-accuracy trade-off can be excluded.
DISCUSSION
Experiment 3 perfectly replicated the finding that the action mode
affects binding and learning differently: action-effect bindings
were unaffected by the action mode (replicating Experiments 1
and 2), whereas ideomotor learning was observed for intention-
based actions only (replicating Herwig et al., 2007; Herwig and
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function of group and compatibility. Error bars represent within-subject
standard errors, calculated separately for each group (Loftus and Masson,
1994).
Waszak, 2009; Herwig and Horstmann, 2011). However, there
are some points that need to be mentioned. First, unlike pre-
vious findings the compatibility effect for the intention-based
group in Experiment 3 was rather small (13 ms instead of 30–
70 ms). This might be due to the fact that in the present study
the contingent effect feature was either task irrelevant in the test
phase or had to compete against another task relevant effect fea-
ture during acquisition (or even a combination of both). Second,
the interaction-effect seems to be driven more by interference
than facilitation in the intention-based group as indicated by
elevated reaction times to incompatible effects but comparable
reaction times to compatible effects. Moreover, comparable to
Experiment 2 action-effect bindings for gender were pronounced
for complete repetitions and alternations of response and num-
ber, whereas, contrary to Experiment 2, they were not reliable
for partial repetitions. This may indicate that there was a bind-
ing between the action and a compound of both effect features
only. If correct, this interpretation would cast doubt on the
notion that the results unequivocally support the non-dependence
hypothesis. This is because we did not test for ideomotor learn-
ing of the action-compound association. However, Experiment
2 revealed that participants actually bind response and gen-
der features even for number alterations. Thus, the difference
between both experiments might be rather due to differences in
power (576 vs. 200 trials in Experiment 2 and 3, respectively)
than to qualitative differences underlying action-effect binding.
To sum up, different effects of the action mode on short-term
bindings and ideomotor learning were replicated within one
experiment which rule out that intermingling effect-producing
actions (subtask one) with choice responses to stimuli (subtask
two) in Experiment 2 might have interfered with ideomotor
learning.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present study aimed at addressing two research questions: are
temporary bindings between action and effect features modulated
by the action mode? How are temporary bindings and long-term
ideomotor learning related?
Concerning the first research question,all experiments reported
above showed strong and long-lasting (up to 6 s) action-effect
bindings, not only for intention-based but also for stimulus-based
actions. Importantly, we found no indication for the strength and
durability of these bindings being dependent on the action mode.
Hence, in contrast to ideomotor learning, temporary action-effect
bindings are not modulated by the action mode. This finding is
corroborated by the results of Janczyk et al. (2012). They used a dif-
ferent approach to assess the strength (but not durability) of short-
term bindings following intention- and stimulus-based actions
which required free- instead of forced choice responses in subtask
2 (Dutzi and Hommel, 2009). Accordingly, repetition rates were
analyzed instead of RTs and error rates. With this slightly different
experimental approach, Janczyk and colleagues also found imme-
diate action-effect bindings for both types of actions. Interestingly,
stimulus-based actions in their study even increased the bias to
repeat the response if the stimulus was also repeated. However,
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they also pointed out that this observation does not necessarily
imply stronger action-effect bindings for stimulus-based action.
Concerning our second research question about the relation-
ship of binding and learning, the results of the present study are in
line with the non-dependence hypothesis and suggest that binding
and learning take place at different representational levels. More-
over, the results are in line with the study from Colzato et al. (2006).
These authors manipulated the conjunction learning strength of
a particular shape-color conjunction (i.e., their study dealt with
bindings between stimulus features). They observed that bind-
ings were not affected by previous learning (hence, Colzato et al.,
2006 investigated the impact of learning on binding, whereas the
present study focused on the impact of binding processes on learn-
ing). Colzato and colleagues concluded that learning is not a direct
consequence of temporary bindings accumulating through Heb-
bian learning (i.e., neurons that fire together, wire together; Hebb,
1949).
It seems, thus, that different neural mechanisms mediate bind-
ing and learning. It has been proposed that temporary feature
binding can be accomplished by selective synchronization of the
firing patterns of feature coding neurons (e.g., von der Malsburg,
1999; Engel and Singer, 2001). Because temporal synchronization
avoids combinatorial problems that are inherent in the principle
of higher-order representations (e.g., cardinal cells, Barlow, 1972),
it is well suited to flexibly represent a large number of frequently
changing feature combinations. In contrast, learning seems to rely
on strengthening of connections between neuron populations via
long-term potentiation (e.g., Zalutsky and Nicoll, 1990; Bliss and
Collingridge, 1993). Consequently, there has to be an additional
process of consolidation that transforms transient bindings into
durable memory traces (for discussions of consolidation processes
in motor learning, see McGaugh, 2000; Robertson et al., 2004;
Hotermans et al., 2006) since otherwise the brain is left without a
trace when synchronization is gone (Wagner, 2001).
This brings us back to the question of why the action mode
can affect the detection of action-effect associations that may be
retrieved at least a couple of minutes after the acquisition. From a
functional perspective, it seems to be crucial that consolidation is
selective, i.e., irrelevant aspects of what binding processes integrate
have to be filtered out while relevant aspects that might be needed
on a later occasion have to be transformed into durable memory
traces. Such filtering might be achieved by redundancy compres-
sion which is proposed to be regulated by the hippocampus (Gluck
and Myers, 1993; Gluck et al., 2003). Redundancy compression
assures that coincidental context information will come to be
represented by a decreasing amount of neurons, whereas the rel-
evant elements of the task remain well represented. In case of
stimulus-based actions, the relevant element of the task is the
stimulus-response rule specifying which motor routines action-
relevant stimuli habitually require. In case of intention-based
actions, in contrast, it is the action-effect rule that is used to con-
trol behavior (Pfister et al., 2010; Herwig and Horstmann, 2011).
Accordingly, differences in ideomotor learning might be due to
the (redundant) effect stimuli being compressed in stimulus-based
actions but not in intention-based actions. A crucial question that
needs to be addressed is whether short-term bindings are actu-
ally immune to the proposed filtering operations accompanying
learning. Although to date there is no direct evidence validat-
ing or refuting this claim in the domain of action-effect learning
and binding, there are already some tentative hints. These hints
can be drawn from studies investigating stimulus-outcome learn-
ing and stimulus-response binding. For instance, Kruschke and
Blair (2000) suggested that the learning phenomenon of con-
ditioned blocking is driven by shifting attention away from the
redundant information. Blocking refers to a situation in which
stimulus-outcome learning is apparently reduced for a new cue
accompanying an old cue that was already learned to perfectly pre-
dict an outcome. On the contrary, bindings seem to be not much
affected by attention (Hommel, 2005) which suggests that bind-
ings might be immune to redundancy compression. This claim
would also fit to our observation, that even in the second half
of Experiment 2 (i.e., when redundancy compression was proba-
bly at work) the action mode did not modify binding strength or
durability.
With the refinement presented above the different-acquisition
hypothesis put forward by Herwig et al. (2007) is also capable of
explaining the divergent results of Wolfensteller and Ruge (2011)
who observed action-effect learning following only 12 stimulus-
based actions-effect episodes. Given their short acquisition phases
it is not unlikely that during the test phase, the effect stimuli were
not yet fully compressed leading to a small but reliable com-
patibility effect. However, based on the present data we cannot
determine whether the action mode affects the acquisition of long-
term action-effect associations prior to their retrieval (as suggested
by the different-acquisition hypothesis of Herwig et al., 2007) or
whether the action mode solely affects the application of these
associations during the test phase (as suggested by the different-
application hypothesis of Pfister et al., 2011). A satisfactory answer
to this question will require future research directly testing whether
intricate differences in the time course of adopting and switching
action modes, as assumed by the different-application hypothesis,
are actually responsible for the divergent results of Herwig et al.
(2007) and Pfister et al. (2011). Obviously, the same holds true
for alternative assumptions attributing the divergent results for
instance to differences in the detection sensitivity of free choice and
forced choice test phases which might be responsible for the detec-
tion or non-detection of weak action-effect associations following
a stimulus-based acquisition.
In summary, the present experiments clearly show that tran-
sient action-effect bindings are unaffected by the action mode.
At the same time, durable memory traces linking actions and
their effects were detected only following intention-based but not
stimulus-based actions. As a consequence the effect of the action
mode on ideomotor learning cannot merely be a result of accu-
mulated action-effect bindings. Instead, we suggest that only those
episodic bindings are selectively perpetuated and retrieved that
integrate action-relevant aspects of the processing event, that is,
in case of intention-based actions, the link between action and
ensuing effect.
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APPENDIX
EXPERIMENT 1
Subtask 1
The first response (R1) to the onset of the go signal was correctly carried out in stimulus-based trials in 330 ms, on average, and in
intention-based trials in 375 ms, on average [t (15)= 3.49, p= 0.003, d = 0.87, two-tailed]. Errors of R1 in stimulus-based trials were
rare (0.2%), as were anticipations and response omissions (stimulus-based: 0.4 and 1.4%, respectively; intention-based: 0.5 and 1.3%,
respectively). The distribution of left-hand vs. right-hand key presses in intention-based trials was nearly equal (49.1 vs. 50.9%; average
of absolute difference between left- and right-hand key presses= 5.9%) and provided a comparable amount of response repetitions
and alternations (50.7 vs. 49.3%).
Subtask 2
Table A1 | Means of mean reaction times (RTs, in ms) and error rates (ER) for R2 in Experiment 1 as a function of the relationship between S1
and S2 and between R1 and R2 and stimulus-onset asynchrony for intention-based and stimulus-based trials.
Stimulus feature repeated Response
Intention-based Stimulus-based
Repeated Alternated Repeated Alternated
RT ER RT ER RT ER RT ER
SOA 1000 ms
Neither 673 8.8 607 0.5 701 5.0 630 0.8
Number 669 1.0 679 3.8 683 1.1 706 3.5
Gender 684 6.5 613 0.8 708 5.8 641 0.8
Both 601 0.5 664 6.6 630 1.3 684 9.2
SOA 2000 ms
Neither 658 4.8 608 0.6 673 5.3 615 0.3
Number 657 2.7 646 1.3 657 4.0 668 2.4
Gender 657 6.0 608 1.6 663 4.7 615 0.5
Both 598 2.4 635 4.8 593 0.8 636 4.5
SOA 6000 ms
Neither 624 1.4 577 1.6 658 3.2 581 1.0
Number 602 2.4 615 1.9 629 1.3 630 2.1
Gender 607 3.8 564 0.8 622 3.0 578 1.3
Both 589 2.5 574 1.5 589 1.6 604 0.5
SOA, stimulus-onset asynchrony.
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Table A2 | Results of analysis of variance on mean reaction times of correct responses (RT) and error rates (ER) for Experiment 1.
Effect df RTR2 ERR2
F η2p p F η
2
p p
SOA 2,30 8.89 0.37 ** 8.95 0.37 **
Am 1,15 0.46 0.03 0.64 0.04
Res 1,15 11.09 0.43 ** 8.42 0.36 *
Num 1,15 0.72 0.05 0.60 0.04
Gen 1,15 15.23 0.50 ** 4.54 0.23 *
SOA×Am 2,30 1.09 0.07 0.02 0.00
SOA×Res 2,30 0.50 0.03 3.43 0.19 *
SOA×Num 2,30 1.06 0.07 0.07 0.00
SOA×Gen 2,30 0.49 0.03 1.21 0.07
Am×Res 1,15 0.03 0.00 0.79 0.05
Am×Num 1,15 0.06 0.00 2.04 0.12
Am×Gen 1,15 0.21 0.01 0.37 0.02
Res×Num 1,15 46.54 0.76 ** 35.18 0.70 **
Res×Gen 1,15 3.17 0.17 5.81 0.28 *
Num×Gen 1,15 16.66 0.53 ** 2.13 0.12
SOA×Am×Res 2,30 0.10 0.01 0.96 0.06
SOA×Am×Num 2,30 0.11 0.01 3.21 0.12
SOA×Am×Gen 2,30 0.20 0.01 3.97 0.21 *
SOA×Res×Num 2,30 2.96 0.17 22.11 0.60 **
SOA×Res×Gen 2,30 0.50 0.03 6.17 0.29 **
SOA×Num×Gen 2,30 3.24 0.18 4.12 0.22 *
Am×Res×Num 1,15 1.37 0.08 0.00 0.00
Am×Res×Gen 1,15 0.30 0.02 0.68 0.04
Am×Num×Gen 1,15 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.00
Res×Num×Gen 1,15 1.01 0.06 7.14 0.32 *
SOA×Am×Res×Num 2,30 0.34 0.02 1.34 0.08
SOA×Am×Res×Gen 2,30 1.50 0.09 0.42 0.03
SOA×Am×Num×Gen 2,30 0.05 0.00 0.18 0.01
SOA×Res×Num×Gen 2,30 2.10 0.12 1.57 0.09
Am×Res×Num×Gen 1,15 0.35 0.12 0.04 0.00
SOA×Am×Res×Num×Gen 2,30 0.25 0.02 2.57 0.15
SOA, stimulus-onset asynchrony; Am, action mode; Res, response; Num, number; Gen, gender. *p<0.05, **p<0.01.
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EXPERIMENT 2
Subtask 1
R1 was correctly initiated in the stimulus-based group in 269 ms, on average, and in the intention-based group in 331 ms, on average
[t (30)= 3.72, p< 0.001, d = 1.32, two-tailed]. Errors of R1 in the stimulus-based group were rare (0.1%), as were anticipations and
response omissions (stimulus-based: 0.6 and 0.7%, respectively; intention-based: 0.2 and 1.2%, respectively). The distribution of left-
hand vs. right-hand key presses in intention-based trials was nearly equal (49.7 vs. 50.3%; average of absolute difference between left-
and right-hand key presses= 2.9%) and provided a comparable amount of response repetitions and alternations.
Subtask 2
Table A3 | Means of mean reaction times (RTs, in ms) and error rates (ER) for R2 in Experiment 2 as a function of the relationship between S1
and S2 and between R1 and R2 and stimulus-onset asynchrony for intention-based and stimulus-based group.
Stimulus feature repeated Response
Intention-based Stimulus-based
Repeated Alternated Repeated Alternated
RT ER RT ER RT ER RT ER
SOA 1000 ms
Neither 600 6.9 538 1.5 691 10.9 560 0.8
Number 573 3.8 566 4.2 602 1.6 614 3.7
Gender 602 6.1 540 0.0 648 4.5 572 0.3
Both 510 2.8 597 8.8 542 0.5 618 9.5
SOA 2000 ms
Neither 581 3.8 518 0.3 621 2.9 562 0.3
Number 573 4.9 547 2.7 591 1.6 579 1.1
Gender 574 8.3 546 0.3 622 3.7 572 0.5
Both 494 2.4 560 6.8 540 0.5 585 7.3
SOA 6000 ms
Neither 558 3.3 507 1.8 583 2.9 540 0.3
Number 543 3.1 518 2.1 583 1.8 564 1.6
Gender 539 2.6 514 1.0 579 2.1 542 1.0
Both 511 3.5 528 2.2 541 0.0 561 2.8
SOA, stimulus-onset asynchrony.
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Table A4 | Results of analysis of variance on mean reaction time of correct responses (RT) and error rates (ER) for Experiment 2.
Effect df RTR2 ERR2
F η2p p F η
2
p p
BETWEEN SUBJECTS
Am 1, 30 1.40 0.04 1.60 0.05
WITHIN SUBJECTS
SOA 2, 60 14.57 0.33 ** 17.95 0.37 **
Response (Res) 1,30 15.40 0.34 ** 4.90 0.14 *
Number (Num) 1,30 9.29 0.24 ** 1.98 0.06
Gender (Gen) 1,30 19.25 0.39 ** 3.76 0.11
SOA×Am 2,60 0.08 0.00 1.34 0.04
SOA×Res 2,60 0.23 0.01 0.11 0.00
SOA×Num 2,60 3.47 0.10 * 0.79 0.03
SOA×Gen 2,60 0.34 0.01 2.86 0.09
Am×Res 1,30 0.62 0.02 2.21 0.07
Am×Num 1,30 0.77 0.03 1.01 0.03
Am×Gen 1,30 1.02 0.03 0.36 0.01
Res×Num 1,30 90.43 0.75 ** 53.15 0.64 **
Res×Gen 1,30 24.98 0.45 ** 11.58 0.28 **
Num×Gen 1,30 15,81 0.35 ** 7.79 0.20 **
SOA×Am×Res 2,60 0.93 0.03 1.30 0.04
SOA×Am×Num 2,60 1.46 0.05 0.90 0.03
SOA×Am×Gen 2,60 1.09 0.04 0.22 0.01
SOA×Res×Num 2,60 26.94 0.47 ** 25.44 0.46 **
SOA×Res×Gen 2,60 1.56 0.05 3.75 0.11 *
SOA×Num×Gen 2,60 1.65 0.05 7.30 0.20 **
Am×Res×Num 1,30 1.40 0.04 1.16 0.04
Am×Res×Gen 1,30 0.30 0.01 3.72 0.11
Am×Num×Gen 1,30 0.01 0.00 1.99 0.06
Res×Num×Gen 1,30 16.61 0.36 ** 17.19 0.36 **
SOA×Am×Res×Num 2,60 1.86 0.06 1.77 0.06
SOA×Am×Res×Gen 2,60 1.13 0.04 0.23 0.01
SOA×Am×Num×Gen 2,60 0.68 0.02 2.22 0.07
SOA×Res×Num×Gen 2,60 0.61 0.02 5.85 0.16 **
Am×Res×Num×Gen 1,30 1.46 0.05 1.10 0.04
SOA×Am×Res×Num×Gen 2,60 1.78 0.06 0.92 0.03
SOA, stimulus-onset asynchrony; Am, action mode; Res, response; Num, number; Gen, gender. *p<0.05, **p<0.01.
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EXPERIMENT 3
Acquisition phase – subtask 1
Participants of the stimulus-based group executed R1 correctly with a mean RT of 290 ms, whereas participants of the intention-based
group executed freely selected actions with a mean RT of 334 ms [t (30)= 1.94, p= 0.06, two-tailed]. Errors of R1 in the stimulus-based
group were rare (0.03%), as were anticipations and response omissions (stimulus-based: 0.4 and 0.8%, respectively; intention-based:
0.1 and 0.8% respectively). The distribution of left-hand vs. right-hand key presses in the intention-based group was nearly equal (49.4
vs. 50.6%, respectively; average of absolute difference between left- and right-hand key presses= 5.6%) which provided a comparable
amount of response repetitions and alternations (49.6 vs. 50.4%).
Acquisition phase – subtask 2
Table A5 | Means of mean reaction times (RTs, in ms) and error rates (ER) for R2 in the acquisition phase of Experiment 3 as a function of the
relationship between S1 and S2 and between R1 and R2 for intention-based and stimulus-based group.
Stimulus feature repeated Response
Intention-based Stimulus-based
Repeated Alternated Repeated Alternated
RT ER RT ER RT ER RT ER
Neither 543 8.5 482 0.5 514 6.1 452 0.8
Number 534 3.7 557 4.2 494 3.7 510 4.0
Gender 544 5.9 495 2.1 524 3.9 473 0.8
Both 471 1.7 557 8.2 423 1.1 482 5.0
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